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Approved For Release 2003/11/25 : CIA-RDP76B00734R000100050034-9
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20451

Adm-13.7

CC

March 14, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VERIFICATION PANEL WORKING GROUP

SUBJECT: Notification, Dismantling and Replacement
Procedures

In response to Mr. Odeen's memorandum of March 12, 1973, attached is a draft of the subject paper. As requested separately by the NSC staff, it has been prepared in the form of draft instructions to the U.S. SCC Commissioner.

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Attachment:
As stated.

Distribution:

NSC - Mr. Odeen
~~CIA - Mr. Duckett~~
CIA -
OSD - Mr. Wood
JCS - RAdm. Doyle
State - Mr. Baker

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State Dept. review completed

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DRAFT INSTRUCTIONS ON
NOTIFICATION, DISMANTLING AND REPLACEMENT
PROCEDURES

The U.S. Commissioner should, at an early meeting of the SCC, address the question of notification, dismantling and replacement procedures under Article III of the Interim Agreement and Articles VIII and XIII-e of the ABM Treaty. He should propose the general guidelines, notification procedures, and specific dismantling/destruction procedures set forth below. The guidelines are for the purpose of establishing criteria upon which procedures can be evaluated and negotiated. The notification procedures establish an agreed timetable to permit focusing of verification resources. The dismantling/destruction procedures specify how replacement/dismantling/destruction will be effected for each of the weapon systems under consideration.

I. General Guidelines

A. Dismantling, destruction and replacement procedures should be considered separately for each system, based upon the unique features of that system. These procedures should take safety and environmental considerations into account.

B. Dismantling, destruction and replacement procedures should not apply to systems which were deactivated prior to the date of signature of the Interim Agreement.

SECRET

SECRET

-2-

C. The procedures should be designed to ensure that:

- the actions taken must be verifiable by national means and must be designed and scheduled to allow for national means of observation by the other side of any event critical to verification.

- substantial delays in the dismantling/destruction activity would not occur.

- system reactivation would be detected by national technical means and that reactivation time would not be substantially less than the time required to obtain a comparable capability through new construction.

- accumulation in a construction status would not be in excess of a reasonable and normal construction schedule.

D. When dismantling/destruction is done to permit replacement by another system, the original system should be made unusable before the new system can be used.

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

II . Notification Procedures.

A. The Soviet Union should notify the U.S. six months in advance of the date on which the SSBN with the 741st SLBM launcher would begin sea trials. Similar notification should apply to each subsequent replacement SSBN. At the time of notification, the pre-1964 ICBM launcher or older ballistic missile submarines subject to dismantling/destruction would be identified by type and location. The number of submarines which have been launched but have not yet begun sea trials should not exceed three.

B. The U.S. would be subject to identical procedures for the SSBN with the 657th SLBM launcher.

C. For systems other than SLBM launchers, advance notification of planned replacement and dismantling/destruction should be adequate to permit identification and accounting of replacement systems and those to be replaced.

D. Notification of the completion of any dismantling/destruction action should be made within one month of completion.

III. Specific Dismantling/Destruction Procedures

A. ABM Facilities (Malmstrom)

All ABM components, including radar components should be removed. Interceptor launchers and buildings designed to house radars should be made unusable by fragmenting. In the case of fragmented launchers and radar buildings, the debris should be left exposed for six months

SECRET

for verification of destruction. After this period of time, earth-coverage of the resulting debris would be permitted.

B. Soft ICBM Launchers

All facilities directly related to the missile and its support (including the weapon itself; launch and handling equipment; and maintenance, support, and storage facilities) should be removed. The launch pad should be destroyed by fragmenting and dispersal. The resulting debris should be left exposed for six months to permit verification of the actions. Earth-coverage would then be permitted. Any facility in a support area which also serves a hard site not scheduled for replacement would be exempt from removal or destruction.

C. ICBM Silo Launchers

Silo doors, silo door rails, exhaust gas ducting, and silo liners/launch tubes, should be removed. Silo headworks should be destroyed or dismantled. The resulting excavation should be left exposed for six months to allow verification of dismantling/destruction action. Earth filling of the excavation would then be permitted.

D. SLBM Submarines and Launchers

SLBM submarines should be sunk in international waters beyond crush depth or should be scrapped in predesignated yards. (FYI -- A third option, which would allow dismantling by removal of the submarine's missile section has not been included since it conflicts with General Guideline C which states that reactivation time should not be substantially less than the time required to obtain a comparable capability through new construction.)

SECRET

-5-

E. ABM R&D Launchers

The launcher should be dismantled and the launch pad should be destroyed. The resulting debris or excavation should be left exposed for six months to allow verification of removal of launcher components. Earth-coverage would then be permitted.

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